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payments for the services of the doctor. This type of arrangement
would have the same result as if the doctor simply paid the hospital
for its essential facilities and services, but it would give the hospital
the advantage of maintaining a staff of doctors with diversified
qualifications on a reasonably certain basis.
The problem is one which should be solved with the utmost haste
for it affects every member of society, and the services of both the
opposing camps are essential in the fight to improve public health
standards. The problem could be solved through the legislatures of
the states but these bodies are at times quite slow to act. It would
seem therefore that the courts should recognize the problem and
judicially modify or even change the rule to conform to the current
needs of society.49
JERRY B. MARTIN

NON-TAX ASPECTS OF THIN INCORPORATION
It is coming to be recognized as the policy of the law that
shareholders should in good faith put at the risk of the
business unencumbered capital reasonably adequate for its
prospective liabilities.
Ballantine,Corporations
I. SCOPE AND BACKGROUND

The coveted privilege of conducting business in the corporate form
is not an unconditional grant.' As consideration for granting the
corporate privilege of doing business with limited liability, the law
requires that the shareholders "put at the risk of the business some
stake which shall appear reasonably adequate for its prospective
needs." 2 This "stake," characterized as equity capital,3 represents
49. Recent developments in the fields of taxation and corporation law will

make it necessary for attorneys concerned with the problem to keep up to
date on current statutes, judicial decisions, and decisions of attorneys
general in their particular states.

1. "Incorporation affords a method of conducting or participating in a
business enterprise with risk limited to the capital which has been put into
that enterprise. It is in the nature of a compromise between entrepreneurs
who, naturally, would like to minimize their risk and creditors who would
seek to enlarge it." LATTY, SuBsI
uu_ AND AFFLATED CoaPoRAToNs 111
(1936).
2. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 570 (rev. ed. 1946). This same idea has been
expressed by Professor Elvin R. Latty: "In other words, the law requires, as
a consideration for granting the privilege of doing business with limited liability, the payment, into the corporate pool of assets, of a fund of property
reasonably adequate for the organization and conduct of a business of the
size, nature, and other characteristics of the business in question." LATTY,
op. cit. supranote 1, at 121.
3. The term "equity capital" is generally used in relation to the capitaliza-
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that portion of the shareholders' capital investment which is required
by law as the basis of financial responsibility for the protection of
corporate creditors. 4 This special fund 5 is substituted for the personal
liability which the participants would otherwise have for the debts of
an unincorporated business. 6 Equity capital is placed unconditionally
at the risk of the business.7 The shareholders, as the owners of the
corporation, are required to be the risk takers as well as the profit
sharers. They cannot shift this burden of business risk to the corporate creditors by placing restrictions upon the investment of equity
capital which would allow the withdrawal of this special fund and
the defeat of the creditors' claims.8 This does not mean, however,
that the participants in a corporate enterprise are limited to the
investment of equity capital as the sole means of capitalization. The
participants may advance assets to the corporation in the form of
tion of corporate enterprises to designate that portion of a corporation's total
capital which is represented by its capital stock. See 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 2.09 (1958); Roimicn, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES §§ 10.01, 10.03 (3d ed. 1958). At the time of initial capitalization,
the amount of a corporation's equity capital will normally be equal to the
amount of its capital stock. Strictly construed, however, equity capital is
the equity of the shareholders in the assets of the corporation after all claims
of corporate creditors, including those of the shareholders, have been deducted. See LATTY, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 134, 135. For a statutory definition
of equity capital see INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1244(c) (2) (B).
4. Equity capital is to be distinguished from the concept of "legal capital"
which is a legislative safeguard for the protection of corporate creditors. For
general discussions of corporate capital see BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 478, 479, 570, 571 (rev. ed. 1946); FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5080
(perm. ed. rev. repl. 1958); ROHRLIcH, op. cit. supra note 3, § 10.01. For nonlegal discussions see DEwiNG, FINANCIAL POLICY or CORPORATIONS 50-58 (4th
ed. 1941); GERSTENBERG, FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT or BusiNESS 76-77 (3d rev. ed. 1951); GUTHMANN & DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL
POLICY 72-77, 337 (3d ed. 1955); KATZ, INTRODUCTION TO ACCOUNTING 151
BUSINESS FINANCE 96 (5th ed. 1941).
(1954); LINcOLN, APPTa
5. Properly speaking, equity capital is not a "fund." See LATTY, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 134, 135. In 1824 Mr. Justice Story stated that "the capital
stock of banks is to be deemed a pledge or trust fund for the payment of
the debts contracted by the bank." Wood v. Drummer, 30 Fed. Cas. 435, 436
(No. 17,944) (C.C. Me. 1824). Although this "trust fund" theory has often
been repeated by the courts, it has generally been discredited by writers in
the field of corporation law. See BALLANTINE, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 479;
Warren, Safeguarding the Creditors of Corporations, 36 HARv. L. REv. 509,
544-47 (1923).
6. See BALLANTINE, op cit. supra note 2, at 4; 1 O'NEAL, op cit. supra note 5,
§ 1.10; ROHRLICH, op. cit. supra note 3, § 4.07.
7. Equity investments, unlike assets advanced by the shareholders as loans
or under lease arrangements, cannot be withdrawn from the business if it
begins to fail. Moreover, equity investments provide no basis for participation by the shareholders in insolvency proceedings on a parity with corporate
creditors if the corporation becomes insolvent.
8. "There is danger that shareholders will try to evade even . . . limited
liability, either by making fictitious contributions to the ostensible capital
or by giving themselves prior claims to the corporate assets or by withdrawing
their investment from the business." BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 2, at
571.
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loans9 or through lease devices.10 Moreover, the corporation may
borrow assets from outsiders." Such capital contributions are characterized as debt capital.'2 Debt capital, as distinguished from equity
capital, is not placed unconditionally at the risk of the business. On
the contrary, debt capital, whether advanced by the shareholders or
outsiders, is normally transferred to the corporation only upon definite
terms and conditions.'3
Traditionally, the concept of creditor protection has been the basic
14
legal theory underlying the capitalization of corporate enterprises,
and the legal impetus has been toward more equity and less debt
capital.' 5 Today, however, the tax laws exert a strong influence
9. The leading English case of Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co., [1897] A.C. 22
(1896), seems to be the first significant decision to hold that a shareholder may
also be a creditor of his own corporation. For American cases which have
sustained a debtor-creditor relationship between corporation and shareholder,
see In re Madelaine, Inc., 164 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1947); Goldstein v. Wolfson,
132 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1943); Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1941).
Cf. Hanson v. Bradley, 298 Mass. 371, 10 N.E.2d 259 (1937). For discussions
of tax cases involving the standing of a shareholder as a creditor of his own
corporation, see Bittker, Thin Capitalization:Some Current Questions, 10 U.
FLA. L. REV. 25 (1957); Schlesinger, Acceptable Capital Structures: How Thin
Is Too Thin?, 5 U. FLA. L. REv. 355 (1952); Schlesinger, "Thin" Incorporations:
Income Tax Advantages and Pitfalls,61 HAnv. L. REv. 50 (1947).
10. See Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 267 Fed. 676 (4th dir.
1920); LATTY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 111-14.
11. See 1 O'NEAL, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2.09; ROImLIcH, op. cit. supra note
3, § 10.02.
12. The term "debt capital" is generally used in relation to the capitalization
of corporate enterprises to designate that portion of a corporation's total
capital which is represented by its outstanding bonds, debentures, notes or
other similar forms of corporate indebtedness. The concept of legal capital
does not include debt. ROHRLICH, op. cit. supra note 3, § 10.01. '"But in common
financial parlance the long term funded debt of a corporation is usually regarded as forming a part of its capital structure." Commissioner v. Neustadt's
Trust, 131 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1942). "The 'capitalization,' financial structure
or permanent financing of a corporation is based on the issue of capital
securities. These include not only stocks but also bonds and debentures,the long term or funded debts." BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 494.
13. This is especially true in the capitalization of a "thin" corporation where
the anticipated tax advantages will depend upon the shareholders' loans
being treated as valid claims against the corporation. See 1 O'NEAL, op. cit.
supra note 3, § 2.11.
14. Although the capitalization of a business serves the primary legal
purpose of protecting corporate creditors, it has two other very practical
functions; (1) the raising of the necessary funds required in the operation
of the business, and (2) the allocation among the shareholders of their
respective participations in the control of the corporation, in the ownership
of its assets, and in the distribution of corporate earnings. See ROHmLiCH, op.
cit. supra note 3, § 10.01. Query, whether the organizers of a corporation
actually give primary consideration to creditor protection in the capitalization
of their business in light of the practical importance of these two latter
functions?
15. See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939); Costello v.
Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Holton,
247 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1957); L & M Realty Corp. v. Leo, 249 F.2d 668 (4th Cir.
1957); Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1941); S. H. Riddle v. Yosemite Creek Co., 322 P.2d 538 (Cal. 1958); Automotriz Del Golfo De Cal. v.
Resnick, 47 Cal.2d 792, 306 P.2d 1 (1957); Shafford v. Otto Sales Co., 149 Cal.
App. 2d 428, 308 P.2d 428 (1957); Carlesimo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal. App. 2d 482,
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which runs directly contrary to the notion of creditor protection.
Under the present tax laws 16 the shareholders in a close corporation
or a one-man company can normally achieve the most advantageous
tax results by incorporating with a minimum of equity capital and
a maximum amount of the total capitalization in the form of debt. 1
The tax-saving device of thin incorporation is currently the most
fashionable method of achieving a low equity capitalization 8 and
produces the most substantial tax advantages. 19 In a thinly incorporated enterprise the participants "furnish all the assets needed by
the corporation and receive from the corporation in return for their
contributions not just stock, but both stock and bonds or other indebtedness of the corporation. '20 Thus a participant occupies the dual
positions of owner and creditor of the corporation. At least four
principal tax advantages flow from thin incorporation.2 ' First, the
interest which the corporation must pay on its debt to the shareholders is deductible as an expense from the gross income of the
corporation. 22 Second, the corporation's obligation to repay its shareholder debt reduces the corporation's risk of incurring the accumulated
197 P.2d 167 (1948). Cf. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Luckenbach
S. S. Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 267 Fed. 676 (4th Cir. 1920); Dixie Coal Mining
& Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 221 Ala. 331, 128 So. 799 (1930); Mosher v. Salt River

Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 39 Ariz. 567, 8 P.2d 1077 (1932); Atwater & Co. v.

Fall River Pocahontas Collieries Co., 119 W. Va. 549, 195 S.E. 99 (1938).
16. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954.
17. "If the equity is small, a substantial part of future earnings frequently
can be retained in the business to retire debts or to finance growth and
expansion. The shareholders will not be taxed on the increase in the net
worth of the corporation until they sell their shares, and then only at capital
gains rates. If a shareholder keeps his shares until he dies, he has realized
no taxable gain as there has been no disposition of the shares; therefore the
shares are subject only to estate and inheritance taxes on their fair market
value." 1 O'NEAL, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2.09, at 53.
18. See generally, 1 O'NEAL, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 2.09-2.13; 2 RABKIN &
(1954);
JOHNSON, FEDERAL INcOME, GIrT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 35.08(2)
ROHRLCH, op. cit. supra note 3, § 10.03; SARNER, ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS OF
SMALL BusINESSES 66-70 (1956); Bittker, Thin Capitalization: Some Current
Questions, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 25 (1957); Schlesinger, Acceptable Capital
Structures: How Thin Is Too Thin?, 5 U. FLA. L. REV. 355 (1952); Schlesinger,
"Thin" Incorporations:Income Tax Advantages and Pitfalls, 61 HARv. L. REV.
50 (1947); Semmel, Tax Consequences of Inadequate Capitalization,48 CoLtuM.
L. REv. 202 (1948).
19. There are two other generally recognized methods for effecting a low
equity capitalization. First, where an existing business such as an individual
proprietor or partnership is to be incorporated, "the participants can
withdraw part of the assets before incorporation and leave the corporation to
operate on reduced assets .... Second, in organizing a business, the participants can contribute only a part of the assets to be used in corporate operations and let the corporation borrow the remainder from outsiders." 1 O'N .AL,
op. cit. supra note 3, § 2.09, at 54. See Schlesinger, Acceptable Capital Structures: How Thin Is Too Thin?, 5 U. FLA. L. REV. 355-59 (1952). For an
example of the first method see Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958).
20. 1 O'NRAL, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2.09, at 54.
21. Ibid.; RommcH, op. cit. supra note 3, § 10.03.
22. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163. If these same distributions of corporate
earnings had been made in the form of dividends, they would not be deductible by the corporation. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 301 (c)(1).
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earnings surtax by providing an additional justification for the retention of accumulated earnings in the business.23 Third, the repayment of the principal debt to the shareholders is treated as a
return of capital, enabling the corporation to distribute corporate
earnings to the shareholders without a dividend tax.24 Fourth, if the
corporation should fail the shareholders may be able to claim a bad
debt deduction rather than a capital loss.25 As noted above, thin
incorporation is a method of capitalization available where the participants are to provide all of the corporate assets and in practice the
foregoing tax considerations are of controlling importance only in
those cases where the participants are supplying the total capitaliza26
tion.
The tax aspects of thin incorporation have been extensively discussed by both the writers27 and the courts.28 However, there has
been very little consideration given to the non-tax consequences
which might flow from this low equity capitalization pattern.29 In
their haste to acclaim the tax advantages inherent in thin incorpora23. INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 531 imposes a surtax on the earnings of a
corporation which "are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs
of the business." The retention of earnings for the purpose of retiring corporate debts normally will not be treated as an "unreasonable accumulation."
See Lion Clothing Co., 8 T.C. 1181 (1947). But, "whether the practice of
deliberately organizing initially with a low equity and a large debt to
accomplish this very end of retaining earnings undistributed will not invoke
a judicial reaction remains to be seen, especially in view of the statutory
reference to corporations 'formed' for the purpose of preventing the imposition
of the surtax on the shareholders." RoHRuIcH, op. cit. supra note 3, § 10.03, at
328, 329.
24. If the shareholders' advances to the corporation were all in the form
of equity investments and represented by shares of stock, these distributions
would run the risk of being taxed to the shareholders as dividends paid on
the redemption of stock. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302.
25. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 165, 166. "A loss sustained on a stock investment is usually subject to the capital loss limitations of the Internal
Revenue Code. On the other hand, a bad debt may be fully deductible (if
incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business) or treated as a short-term
capital loss which is still an advantage to the creditor over the shareholder
who holds his stock more than six months." RoHRLIcH, op. cit. supra note 3,
§ 10.03, at 329.
26. See ROHmLicH, op cit. supra note 3, § 10.03, at 322, 323.
27. See note 18 supra.
28. E.g., John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946) (in which
the Court combined for decision Commissioner v. John Kelley Co., 146 F.2d 466
(7th Cir. 1944), and Talbot Mills v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d 809 (1st Cir.
1944)); Maloney v. Spencer, 172 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1949); Wilshire & Western
Sandwiches, Inc. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1949); Ruspyn Corp.,
18 T.C. 769 (1952); Pierce Estates, Inc., 16 T.C. 1020 (1951); Sabine Royalty
Corp., 17 T.C. 1071 (1951); Isidor Dobkin, 15 T.C. 31 (1950), aif'd per curiam,
192 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1951); Arthur V. McDermott, 13 T.C. 468 (1949); Swoby
Corp., 9 T.C. 887 (1947); 1432 Broadway Corp., 4 T.C. 1158 (1945), af'd per
curiam, 160 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1947).
29. At least two writers in the field of corporation law, however, have
indicated the problems which may arise between the conflicting concepts of
creditor protection and low equity capitalization. See 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 2.10 (1958); Romu.IcI, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BusiNESS ENTERPRISES § 10.03 (3d ed. 1958).
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tion, the tax writers seem to have overlooked the fundamental concept
of corporation law which requires that the shareholders bear the risk
of their business by unconditionally investing assets in the corporation
which are sufficient to protect the corporate creditors. The purpose
of this note is to consider the legal consequences, other than tax,
which may result from the practice of thin incorporation. The note is
limited to a consideration of the two principal results which may be
produced by inadequate equity capital: 30 (1) Where the corporation
has been inadequately capitalized, the shareholders may be denied
the right to assert a claim as a creditor against the corporation except
in subordination to the claims of outside creditors; and (2) where
the capital structure is "too thin" to perform its legal function of
protecting corporate creditors, the shareholders may be held personally liable for claims against the corporation.
II. INADEQUATE EQUITY CAPITAL

At the outset it is necessary to clearly define what is meant by the
term "inadequate equity capital" in relation to the denial of limited
liability and the subordination of shareholders' claims against the
corpoiation. Inadequate capital is not here used in the strict sense
of the "legal"3' 1 or "stated"3 2 capital required by general corporation
statutes as the "margin of net assets or value which is to be retained
in the business as against withdrawals in favor of the shareholders." 33
Although the concept of legal or stated capital is designed to protect
corporate creditors by limiting the payment of dividends to the shareholders and the purchase by the corporation of its own stock,34 it does
not purport to be an adequate measure of the financial needs of the
30. One of the non-legal consequences which may result from thin capitalization is the impairment of the corporation's future credit standing. The
initial debt burden may be so large as to preclude the possibility of future
borrowing from outside creditors.
31. "The legal capital is an amount, a limitation, not the actual corporate
assets or property." BALLANTINE, CoRPoRATIoNs 478 (rev. ed. 1946). Legal

capital is normally an amount equal to the aggregate par value of all shares
issued with a par value. If the corporation has outstanding shares with no
par value, then the legal capital will include an amount equal to the aggregate
consideration received for these shares which has been allocated to the
capital account.
32. 'With the introduction of no-par value shares, more precise definitions
of the legal capital of both par and no-par shares became necessary. Modern
corporation acts have . . . substituted the term 'stated capital.' This term is
. .. derived from the practice of specifying that part of the subscription price
for no-par shares which should be attributed to capital and that part which
is attributed to paid-in surplus." BALLANTINE, Op cit. supra note 31, at 478.
For a thorough discussion of the term "stated capital" as used in modern
corporation statutes, see Garrett, Capital and Surplus Under the New Corporation Statutes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 239, 245-57 (1958).
33. BALLANTN, op. cit. supranote 31, at 479.
34. Ibid.
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particular business. 35 Nor is inadequate capital here used in the
economic sense of the total assets required in the operation of the
corporation's business. 36 The total amount of all the assets used in
the corporate enterprise may be fully adequate to meet the operational demands of the business in question,37 but this is no assurance
that the required proportion, of risk capital has been invested by the
shareholders.
"Equity capital," in its causal relation to the denial of limited
liability and the subordination of shareholders' claims, is more nearly
synonymous with the accounting concept of corporate capital which
is variously expressed as "net worth," "proprietorship," or "proprietary
equity."3 8 "It is the value of the contribution to the corporate estate
by the shareholders arrived at by ascertaining the excess in value,
if any, of the assets over all liabilities, including liabilities (aside
from capital stock) to the proprietary interests. ' 39 In other words, it
is the equity of the shareholders in the assets of the corporation after
all claims of corporate creditors, including those of the shareholder40
creditors, have been deducted.
35. "[Legal] capital is often purely an arbitrary proportion of the consideration received for shares of stock which some one has decided to segregate.on
paper and label 'capital' . . . . Such capital may be but nominal and still have
no bearing on creditors' rights." LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED COR-

PORATIONS 134 (1936).
36. In the economic sense, the capital of a corporation includes all its assets
from whatever source derived, encompassing both equity and debt capital.
See FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5080 (Pern.

ed. rev. repl. 1958).

As

one writer has stated, "the distinction between owned and borrowed, although
very important from the point of view of financial policy, is in the end legal
and not economic. The corporation uses its capital as a single fund, whatever
the sources or the obligations involved in getting it and holding it." DEWING,
FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 50 (4th ed. 1941). From the economic
standpoint, the capitalization of a corporation is not controlled by the factor
of creditor protection. Rather, the capital structure will be determined by
such factors as the amount of funds initially required, the prospects for future
growth, the expected "turnover" of operating assets, the estimated return on
investments, the allocation of corporate control, and the predicted stability
of earnings.

See GuTrmAxN

& DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 184

(3d ed. 1955). For a discussion of the methods of financing small business
enterprises see ROHRLIcH, op cit. supra note 29, § 10.02. See generally Masslich, Financing a New Enterprise, 5 ILL. L. REV. 70 (1910); Rohrlich, Some
Current Thoughts on Corporate Capitalization,1 VAND. L. REV. 553 (1948);
Weaver, Equity Financing for the Small Firm, Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar.-Apr.
1956, p. 91; Wilhelm, How Small Business Competes for Funds, 11 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 220 (1945).
37. "Ordinarily, in one of these corporations organized with what is here
called inadequate capital, the totality of all the assets used in the corporation's
business, that is, the aggregate of the property (including money and credit)
made available to its use by the [shareholders] . . . through loans, leases,
mortgages, etc., is perfectly adequate to operate the business in question."
LATTY, op. cit. supranote 35, at 134.
38. For discussions of these accounting terms, see KATZ, INTRODUCTION TO
ACCOUNTING §§ 97-105 (1954); FINNEY & MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING-

INTRODUCTORY, ch. 1 (5th ed. 1957).
39. LATTY, op. cit. supranote 35, at 135.
40. This is merely an expression of the fundamental accounting equationthat proprietorship equals assets minus liabilities.
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Yet the legal consequences of inadequate equity capital do not
flow from the mere fact that this equity capital is low; else the
privilege of limited liability would be lost at the very time when it
is most needed, i.e., when the shareholders' original equity investment
has been depleted and the corporation begins to fail.41 Under such
circumstances the law does not require the shareholders to cease
business and liquidate the corporation on the penalty of losing their
immunity from personal liability. Low equity capital, of itself, is not
the objectionable feature which results in the denial of limited liability
or the subordination of shareholders' claims to outside creditors.
Rather, it is a low ratio of equity capital to debt capital which
constitutes the critical factor in these cases.42 The law objects to a
low ratio of equity capital to debt capital because it allows the shareholders to shift the risks of the enterprise to the corporate creditors
by advancing assets to the corporation which are not placed unconditionally at the risk of the business. 43 The evil lies in the fact
that creditors are led to deal with the corporation on the basis of the
total capital investment, whereas only a part of that total capital is
actually ventured unconditionally for the protection of corporate
creditors. For example, if a creditor deals with a corporation whose
total capital requirement is $20,000 his risk is considerably greater
where $15,000 of that amount is in the form of loans made by the
shareholders to the corporation than where $15,000 is in the form
of equity capital and only $5,000 in the form of debt capital.
Defining the nature of "inadequate equity capital" is a relatively
simple matter. The remaining problem of ascertaining what constitutes inadequate equity capital for the particular business in question, how the adequacy of this capital is to be determined and at
what point in the life of the corporation this determination is to be
made is clearly more difficult. What is adequate or inadequate equity
capital is not subject to a test which can be applied with mathematical
certainty in every case. A moment's reflection will convince one of
the difficulty in determining what the risks involved in the operation
of a particular business are and whether the shareholders have met
those risks by the investment of an adequate amount of equity
capital. 44 It can only be said in general terms that "a separate finan41. One of the chief attributes of incorporation is the shareholders' privilege
of doing business with the risk of personal liability limited to their corporate
investments. The shareholders are not charged with duty of capitalizing
their corporation to meet all possible liabilities which may arise in the future.
As one writer has stated, "it seems obvious that capitalization reasonably
adequate to carry on the particular business must always be tested as of the
time of the inception of corporate existence rather than near its economic
death." LA uN, CoaRoaRToNs 72 (1959).
42. See cases cited note 15 supra.
43. See LAry, op. cit. supra note 35, at 135, 136.
44. Perhaps this difficulty accounts for the courts' general tendency to rest

NOTES
cial unit should be set up and maintained. This unit should be
sufficiently financed so as to carry the normal strains upon it. The
risks attendant on the conduct of a business of that type can roughly
be averaged and that average met. '45 Although the law' objects to a
46
low ratio of equity capital to debt capital, some debt is allowed.
But even though some ratio of equity to debt is allowed, the courts
have not attempted to indicate what is a permissible ratio. Moreover, it would seem that the fixing of such an allowable ratio is a
practical impossibility because a ratio which is permissible in one
industry might be excessive in another, and even within a single
industry no two enterprises are exactly the same.47 It is generally
agreed that the adequacy of the capitalization is to be tested at the
time of the organization of the business. 48 But as one writer has
recently indicated: "Post-organization manipulation by the [shareholders] ... which weakens the [corporation's] financial position will
tend to have the same, and probably even more serious, consequences
'49
than initial under-capitalization.
Thus, while the nature of inadequate equity capital may be defined
with reasonable certainty, the ultimate problem of what is adequate
or inadequate equity capital for a particular business and how this
adequacy is to be tested remains largely unanswered. As the following cases illustrate, however, the courts are giving increased vitality
to inadequate capital in limiting the extent to which shareholders
may be creditors of their own enterprise and still avail themselves
of the privilege of doing business as a corporation. In considering
these cases it is important to bear in mind the relation of inadequate
capital, as herein defined, to the tax-saving device of thin incorporation. Under the practice of thin incorporation the shareholders are
seeking to achieve the very type of capital structure to which the
law objects, i.e., capitalization with a low equity to debt ratio. Where
this device has been resorted to in practice, equity to debt ratios as
low as 1:2 and even 1:4 are not uncommon. 50 It is submitted that such
low equity capitalization is potentially a determinative factor in
subjecting the participants in a thin corporation to the danger of
incurring the consequences discussed in the following material.
their decisions on such theories as the "alter ego" or "instrumentality" rule
rather than enter into a discussion and analysis of inadequate capital as a
determinative factor in these cases.
45. Douglas & Shanks, Insulation From Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations,39 YALE L.J. 193, 196, 197 (1929).
46. See note 9, supra.
47. See 1 O'NEAL, op. cit. supra note 29, § 2.10, at 59.
48. See LATIm, CoRPoRATIoNs 72 (1959); LATTY, op. cit. supra note'35, at
120, 121; RoaI~cH, op. cit. supra note 29, § 12.03, at 443.
49. Id. at 443, 444.
50. See Schlesinger, Acceptable Capital Structures: How Thin Is Too Thin?,
5 U. FLA. L. REv. 355 (1952).
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OF THIN INCORPORATION

Thin incorporation, although laden with attractive tax advantages
for the participants in a closely held corporation, is potentially
capable of producing at least two serious, non-tax consequences. First,
the courts in insolvency proceedings may deny the shareholders
standing to assert claims as creditors against their own corporation
and treat their loans and other forms of debt contributions to the
corporation as equity capital. 51 In some cases the courts may allow
the shareholder-creditors to establish claims against their insolvent
corporation, but only in subordination to the claims of outside
creditors. 52 Second, the courts may treat the low equity capitalization
as an abuse of the separate entity privilege and hold the shareholders
personally liable for claims against the corporation. 3 These consequences are directly attributable, either in whole or in part, to
inadequate equity capital. However none of the cases in which inadequate equity capital has been recognized as a determining factor
in the imposition of these consequences have involved what is presently termed a thinly incorporated enterprise. 54 Some of the cases have
involved corporations, organized prior to the enactment of the present
tax laws, whose low equity capitalization was not designed to obtain
the tax benefits of thin incorporation. Other cases have involved
parent-subsidiary relationships where the courts imposed these consequences upon the parent corporation of an inadequately capitalized
subsidiary. In all of the cases, however, the decisions have rested,
at least in part, upon the theory that the shareholders failed to provide the corporation with an adequate amount of equity capital, thus
throwing the risks of the business upon the corporate creditors. These
cases illustrate the potential non-tax consequences which may befall
the participants in a thinly incorporated enterprise. The parentsubsidiary cases are particularly relevant, not only because they have
given rise to one of the leading doctrines in this area of the law, but
also because "subsidiary corporations have many of the characteristics
of close corporations; and the literature on subsidiary and parent corporations is often helpful in solving close corporation problems." 55
51. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939); Costello v.
Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958); Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d 497 (5th Cir.
1941); 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS

52. See cases cited note 51 supra.

§ 2.10 (1958).

53. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 122, 129; 1 O'NEAL, op. cit. supra note
51, § 1.10.
54. See text accompanying note 20 supra; cf. Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903
(9th Cir. 1958).
55. 1 O'NEAL, op. cit. supra note 51, § 1.05,

at 6. Professor Latty, however,
would draw a distinction between the consequences imposed upon the parent
corporation of an inadequately capitalized subsidiary and the individual shareholders of an inadequately capitalized corporation. LATTY, SuBsInDIARs AND
AFFIATED CORPORATIONS ch. 8 (1936). But the courts have not adopted this
distinction. See Automotriz Del Golfo De Cal. v. Resnick, 47 Cal.2d 792, 306

1960]

NOTES
A. Denial and Subordinationof Shareholder'sClaims
Against the Corporation

Any discussion of the judicial treatment of shareholders' claims as
creditors of their own corporation must begin with the landmark
case of Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co., Ltd.,56 decided by the House
of Lords in 1897. In that case an enterprising merchant, Aaron
Salomon, transferred his profitable business to a private limited
company whose incorporators were Salomon and members of his
family. Salomon received for his business a total price of 39,000
pounds, paid by 1000 pounds in cash, 10,000 pounds in debentures
secured by a first lien on all the assets of the company, and 20,000
fully paid up shares. Only seven shares were issued to Salomon's
family. From these facts it appears that the corporation was capitalized with an equity to debt ratio of approximately 2:1.57 After
a brief career the company became bankrupt. In the insolvency proceedings, the rights of Salomon as a secured creditor of his own
corporation were attacked by outside creditors on the ground that
Salomon would take all the assets under his debentures, leaving the
corporate creditors with nothing. The lower courts sustained the
contentions of the outside creditors, holding that it was unlawful
to create such a judgment-proof arrangement under which the owner
was to take all the profits without running the risks of the business. 58
In reversing the lower courts, the House of Lords upheld the validity
of the corporate arrangement and permitted Salomon to prove a claim
on his debentures in priority to the outside creditors.
The Salomon case established the proposition that a shareholder
may be a creditor as well as an owner of his corporation.59 From the
standpoint of corporate capitalization the case also stands as an early
indication that some ratio of equity capital to debt capital is allowable. 60 Since the Salomon case there have been a number of
P.2d 1 (1957); Carlesimo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal. App. 2d 482, 197 P.2d 167
(1948).
56. [1897] A.C. 22 (1896).
57. In addition to the amounts enumerated, Salomon received for his
transfer a sum not noted in the report which was paid in discharge of his
personal business debts.
58. Broderip v. Salomon, [1895] 2 Ch. 323.
59. However, this proposition has not been accepted without question.
Professor Ballantine has stated that: "the most questionable point upheld [in
the Salomon case] . . . was that of permitting a sole shareholder to prove a
claim on his debentures in priority to the unsecured creditors, when he had
created at the outset a kind of judgment proof setup . . . ." BALLANTINE, op.
cit. supra note 53, at 301, 302. Although the policy reasons for allowing a
shareholder to occupy the status of a creditor of his own corporation may be
questioned, as a practical matter the shareholders may be the only source
of credit for some small corporations.
60. The case has been cited as an early indication that a ratio of more
than two parts equity capital to one part debt will be an acceptable capitalization. See LATTY, op. cit. supra note 55, at 136.
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decisions by American courts which have permitted shareholders to
assert a claim as a creditor of their own corporation. 61 "But the
courts will scrutinize the good faith and fairness of a transaction by
which the controlling shareholders seek to recover a purported loan
to themselves in what is their own business in competition with other
creditors, and will consider the adequacy of the capital furnished
and other circumstances. 62
The leading doctrine in this area of the law is the well-known "Deep
Rock doctrine" which was laid down by the Supreme Court in Taylor
v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co.63 In that case the Standard Gas & Electric
Company sought to establish a claim in the insolvency proceedings of
the Deep Rock Oil Corporation, a subsidiary organized and controlled
by Standard. Standard owned all of Deep Rock's common stock,
which was the sole voting stock, and completely controlled the
subsidiary's management. Deep Rock also had publicly-held preferred stock and an issue of notes outstanding in public hands. From
64
the time of its organization Deep Rock was inadequately capitalized,
and borrowed extensively throughout its life on an open account from
Standard. At the time of Deep Rock's bankruptcy the open account
showed a balance of $9,000,000 which was the basis of Standard's claim
in the insolvency proceedings. The preferred shareholders of Deep
Rock contested Standard's claim on the ground that Deep Rock was
a mere instrumentality or agent of Standard. The Supreme Court
sustained the contentions of the preferred shareholders and subordinated Standard's claim to the claims of the preferred shareholders
and outside creditors of Deep Rock, but not under the "instrumentality rule. '63 Rather, the Court rested its decision upon "the broader
equitable principle that the doctrine of corporate entity, recognized
generally and for most purposes, will not be regarded when so to do
would work fraud or injustice. '66 The Court held that the inadequate
capitalization and mismanagement of Deep Rock by Standard were
appropriate circumstances for the application of the principle in this
67
case.
61. See cases cited note 9 supra.
62. BALLANTINE, Op. cit. supra note 53, at 302.
63. 306 U.S. 307 (1939).

64. "From the outset Deep Rock was insufficiently capitalized, was topheavy
with debt and was in parlous financial condition. Standard so managed [Deep
Rock's] ...affairs as always to have a stranglehold upon it." Id. at 315.
65. The "instrumentality rule" is a verbal formula often used by the courts
in holding a parent corporation liable for the acts and debts of its subsidiary
company where the parent has so controlled and managed the subsidiary that
the latter has no separate and independent existence, but is deemed a part of
the parent corporation. However, the formula has been criticized as failing

to deal realistically with the problem of the abuse of the corporate entity
privilege. See BALLANN, op. cit. supra note 53, at 293; LATTY, op. cit. supra

note 55, at 156-91.
66. 306 U.S. 307, at 322.
67. These two factors have been characterized as the inadequate capitali-
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The Deep Rock doctrine has been interpreted to mean at least this:
Where a showing can be made that a subsidiary corporation having public
preferred stockholders [or creditors] was inadequately capitalized from
the outset and was managed substantially in the interest of its parent,
rather than in its own interests, the parent will not, in a bankruptcy or
reorganization proceeding affecting the subsidiary, be permitted to assert
a claim as a creditor, except in subordination to the claims of preferred
stockholders [or creditors of the subsidiary] .68
Although the Deep Rock doctrine has been applied primarily in
cases involving a parent-subsidiary relationship, 69 the underlying
principles seem equally applicable to the individual shareholders in a
one-man company or a close corporation.70 Moreover, the inadequate
capitalization aspect of the doctrine, with its impetus toward more
equity capital and less debt, is clearly contrary to the tax concept
of thin incorporation which is in the direction of less equity and more
debt. The doctrine might well be imposed to prevent the participants
in a thinly incorporated enterprise from asserting a claim against the
corporation on the basis of their loans or other forms of debt investments, except in subordination to the claims of outside creditors.
In Arnold v. Phillips,7 1 the principles of the Deep Rock doctrine were
applied in determining an individual shareholder's standing to assert
a claim as a creditor of his insolvent corporation with respect to loans
made at the time of the corporation's organization and during its
operating life. In that case Arnold and two others incorporated a
brewing company with an authorized capital stock of $50,000, all paid
in cash by Arnold. Arnold held 498 shares of stock, and the other
two incorporators each held one share. During the first year Arnold
made additional advances of approximately $75,500 to complete the
plant and begin operations. After two years of prosperous business,
the corporation began to fail and Arnold made further advances of
about $50,000. Subsequently the corporation failed and Arnold sought
to participate in the bankruptcy proceedings on the basis of the two
series of advances. There was no evidence of intentional fraud or
mismanagement by Arnold. The court treated the two series of ad-.
vances separately, holding the advances made during the organizazation and mismanagement aspects of the Deep Rock doctrine. See RoHi.IcH,
ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BusINEss ENTERPRISES § 10.03 (3d ed. 1958).

68. Israels, The Implications and Limitations of the "Deep Rock" Doctrine,

42 COLUm. L. REv. 376, 379 (1942). For other discussions of the Deep Rock
doctrine see Hornstein, A New Forum for Stockholders, 45 COLUM. L. REv.
35 (1945); Krotinger, The "Deep Rock" Doctrine: A Realistic Approach to'
Parent-SubsidiaryLaw, 42 CoLUM. L. REV. 1124 (1942); Sprecher, The Conflict of Equities under the "Deep Rock" Doctrine, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 336
(1943).
69. See Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941);
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Gannet Co. v. Larry, 221 F.2d 269 (2d
Cir. 1955).
70. See RonpucH, op. cit. supra note 67, § 10.03, at 321.
71. 117 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1941).
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tional period to be equity capital for which Arnold could not assert
a claim in bankruptcy but sustaining his claim for the advances
made after the corporation had begun operations. As to the first
advances the court stated that: "Although the charter provided for
no more capital than $50,000, what it took to build the plant and
equip it was a permanent investment, in its nature capital." 72 Thus,
the court considered the total equity capital to be $125,50073 which
then reflected a ratio of equity to debt of approximately 2.5:1. The
court held this to be an adequate amount of equity capital, stating
that: "It would be hard to say in this case that $50,000 was not
a substantial capital, and impossible so to say after holding that the
real capital was $125,000, though some of it was irregularly paid
in."74 In allowing Arnold's claim on the second series of advances
the court did not apply a ratio test, but applied what has been
termed the "normalcy test, '7 5 i.e., whether such debt contributions
"would be available to similar corporations in similar circumstances
through the ordinary commercial and financial channels, unaided by
any bolstering from the proprietary interests." 76 The court's reasoning was that if a bank would lend, why not let the controlling
shareholder lend?
Arnold v. Phillips represents the first significant application of the
principles of the Deep Rock doctrine to an individual shareholder.
From the standpoint of thin incorporation the case clearly indicates
that the low equity capitalization of a thinly incorporated enterprise
may constitute a controlling factor in determining the participants'
standing to prove a claim as a creditor of their own corporation if
the business should fail. In this regard it is important to note that
the element of mismanagement, a determining factor in Taylor v.
Standard Gas & Elec. Co. and one aspect of the Deep Rock doctrine,
77
was expressly found by the court to be absent in the Arnold case.
The case stands, therefore, as an indication that the factor of inadequate capitalization, alone, may constitute sufficient grounds for
denying shareholder-creditors' claims against their insolvent corporation. The case is also significant from the standpoint of thin incorporation in that the court treated the two series of advances separately.
The loans and other forms of debt contributions made by the
72. Id. at 501.
73. This was the total amount of Arnold's equity investment in the business,
i.e., the original $50,000 investment plus the first series of advances of $75,500
which the court treated as equity capital.
74. 117 F.2d 497, 502.
75. See LATTY, op. cit. supranote 55, at 136.
76. Ibid.
77. "There is nothing to show the enterprise was entered upon or prosecuted
with a fraudulent purpose. . . We do not find any such mismanagement as
would compel disregard of the corporate entity as a remedy against injustice."
117 F.2d 497, 502.
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shareholders under the practice of thin incorporation are almost always made during the organizational phase of the corporate life. 8
According to the decision in Arnold v. Phillips,advances made during
this period seem to be subjected to a more rigid test and treated as
equity investments if they are used in creating the corporation or
putting it into operation. The court did not consider the adequacy
or inadequacy of the authorized capital in determining that these
advances were to be treated as equity capital. Thus the case at
least raises the question of whether advances made during the
organizational phase of the corporate life are to be subjected to a
different test to the extent that they are used in bringing the corporation into existence as an operating unit.
Since Arnold v. Phillips there have been two recent cases involving
the subordination of shareholders' claims primarily on the basis of
inadequate equity capital, in which it was shown that the low
equity capitalization was resorted to in order to obtain better income
tax results.
In the most recent case, Costello v. Fazio,79 three partners, operating
with a total capital investment of $51,620, decided to incorporate
their business. In order to achieve the best tax consequences, they
converted $45,620 of their investment into debt capital prior to
incorporation by having the partnership execute promissory notes
to them for this amount. Thus the corporation was left to operate on
equity capital of only $6,000 which reflected an equity to debt ratio
of less than 1:7 at the time of organization. The corporation subsequently became bankrupt and the shareholders' claims were opposed
by the trustee in bankruptcy on the ground that the promissory
notes actually represented equity investments. Accounting experts
and financial analysts were called for both sides to testify on the
question of the adequacy of the corporation's equity capital. One
witness for the shareholder-claimants testified that the capital account was transferred to a debt account because "it was contemplated
that the notes would be paid out of the profits of the business....
[I]f promissory notes had not been issued, the profits would have
been distributed only as dividends, and.., as such they would have
been taxable." 80 A majority of the expert witnesses felt that the
corporation needed at least as much equity capital as the partnership
required before the reduction took place.81 The court held that the
78. "[T]he use of debt in the capitalization of a corporation calls for
planning before incorporation. After a corporation has been organized and
commences operations, an attempt to recapitalize by issuing bonds for part
of the stock is almost certain to have disastrous tax consequences." 1 O'NEAL,
CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 2.09, at 56 (1958).
79. 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958).
80. Id. at 907.
81. One witness testified that "...
in incorporating a business already in
existence, where the approximate amount of permanent capital needed had
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corporation was "grossly undercapitalized" and that the shareholders'
claims should be subordinated to the claims of outside creditors.
Costello v. Fazio seems to be the first significant case in which
the principles developed in Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co. and
Arnold v. Phillips have been applied to impose non-tax consequences
upon the participants in a thinly incorporated enterprise. Although
the method of capitalization used in the Costello case does not fall
precisely within the narrow definition of "thin incorporation," it does
represent one of the recognized methods for achieving a low equity
capitalization and produces the same beneficial tax results. 82 In the
Costello case the court was squarely presented with the issue of
what constituted adequate equity capital for the particular business in
question. The court properly found that the corporation was inadequately capitalized, but erroneously characterized the term "adequacy of capital" as referring to "legal capital, or stated capital." 83
As explained previously, inadequate capital in its causal relation to
the subordination of shareholders' claims does not refer to legal or
stated capital.8 4 In reaching its decision, the court was also faced with
the question of whether the factor of mismanagement was a necessary
requisite to the subordination of the shareholders' claims. The shareholder-claimants had argued that "fraud or mismanagement must
always be present if claims are to be subordinated in a situation
involving undercapitalization. ' 85 The court held that: "This is not
the rule. The test to be applied, as announced in [Taylor v. Standard
Gas & Elec. Co.] ... is whether the transaction can be justified 'within the bounds of reason and fairness.' ",86 Thus, in addition to illustrating the application of the principles of the Deep Rock doctrine to
a thinly incorporated enterprise, Costello v. Fazio offers a definite
ruling on the point indicated in Arnold v. Phillips, i.e., that the
element of mismanagement is not a requisite to the subordination of
shareholders' claims where equity capital is found to be inadequate.
In the earlier case of L. & N. Realty Co. v. Leo,87 the question of
'been established by experience, normal procedure called for continuing such
capital in the form of common or preferred stock." Id. at 906.
82. See note 19 supra. Actually the incorporation in this case falls very
nearly within the technical definition of "thin incorporation," because the
transaction was essentially a withdrawal of equity investments and reinvesting
them in the form of debt contributions to the new corporation.
83. The court stated that: "when we speak of inadequacy of capital in
xegard to whether loans by shareholders shall be subordinated to claims of
general creditors, we are not referring to working capital. We are referring
to the amount of the investment of the shareholders in the corporation. This
capital is usually referred to as legal capital, or stated capital in reference to
restrictions on the declaration of dividends to stockholders." 256 F.2d 903, 907.
84. See discussion of inadequate equity capital in text accompanying notes
31-35 supra.
85. 256 F.2d 903, 910.
86. Ibid.
87. 249 F.2d 668 (4th Cir. 1957).

1960]

NOTES

a shareholder's standing as a creditor of his own corporation arose
under unusual circumstances. There, the estate of a deceased shareholder filed an involuntary petition in bankruptcy against the
corporation on the ground that the surviving shareholder had made
preferential payments to outside creditors which exhausted the
corporate assets and left the shareholders' claims unpaid. The standing of the estate to file this petition depended upon whether the
claim of the deceased shareholder, which the estate asserted, was of
the same class as the claims of outside creditors. If the deceased
shareholder's claim was to be subordinated to outside claims then
it was not in the same class and no preferential treatment had
resulted from the satisfaction of the latter. It was shown that the
shareholders had incorporated a real estate business with an equity
investment of $19,000, and that shortly after its organization they
had advanced approximately $17,000 apiece in the form of loans. In
subordinating the shareholders' claims and dismissing the involuntary
petition, the court found "that the money was advanced as loans
rather than as subscription to stock in the thought that this would
be helpful for income tax purposes." 88 The court stated that: "In
such situation, while the loans are not to be treated as investments
in stock, it is clear that they were capital contributions to a corporation inadequately capitalized and that... they should be subordinated
to the claims of other creditors." 89 The corporation was not, strictly
speaking, a "thin corporation" initially organized with a low equity
to debt capitalization for tax-saving purposes, but the evidence indicates that the shareholders attempted to achieve the same effect by
periodic loans to the corporation.
From these cases it can be seen that the courts will carefully
scrutinize the fairness and good faith of any transaction whereby the
shareholders attempt to assert a claim as a creditor of their own
corporation and will deny the claim or subordinate it to the claims
of outsiders where equity demands. 90 And, as Arnold v. Phillips and
Costello v. Fazio indicate, inadequate capitalization, which is an inherent characteristic of the tax-saving device of thin incorporation,
may constitute sufficient grounds for the application of these broad
equitable principles.
88. Id. at 670.
89. Ibid.
90. For additional cases involving the validity of shareholder claims, see
In re Madelaine, Inc., 164 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1947) (shareholders advances
made at the time they purchased corporate stock upheld as valid loans); Goldstein v. Wolfson, 132 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1943) (shareholders' claims allowed on
ground that "only capital contributions were intended at the time when the
advances were made"); cf. Hanson v. Bradley, 298 Mass. 371, 10 N.E.2d 259
(1937) (shareholders' claims allowed in priority to outside creditor because
outside creditor dealt with corporation with knowledge that the business was
in poor financial condition).
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B. Denial of Limited Liability
It has been stated that: "An obvious inadequacy of capital, measured
by the nature and magnitude of the corporate undertaking, has
frequently been an important factor in cases denying stockholders
their defense of limited liability."9' 1 However, where the courts have
imposed personal liability upon the shareholders for corporate debts,
they have seldom rested their decisions solely upon inadequate
capitalization. Rather, they have preferred to base their decisions
upon the "alter ego" 92 or "instrumentality"9 3 theories, using inadequate
capitalization only as a contributing factor in determining whether
these theories should be applied. But as one writer has stated:
"Inadequacy of the capital which is risked by the individuals who
avail themselves of the corporate device is of far more vital concern
to creditors of the corporation than the failure to observe the many
niceties of corporate formalities upon which the courts sometimes
appear to base their decisions. '94 In many of the cases no real problem is presented, because the shareholders have failed to create any
stated capital by the issuance of stock and the evidence shows that
the corporation's liabilities exceeded its assets almost from the outset.95 In such cases it seems obvious that undercapitalization alone
is the real reason for disregarding the corporate entity, irrespective of
the courts' discussions of the "alter ego" and "instrumentality"
theories.
In the early case of Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 6
where the Luckenbach Company, capitalized at $800,000, had leased
steamships worth several million dollars to an affiliated company,
capitalized at only $10,000, the larger company was held liable for a
claim incurred by the smaller affiliate. In addition to the inadequate
capitalization of the lessee corporation, it was shown that the two
companies were maintained and managed substantially as one corporation. In holding the larger company liable, the court stated that:
"For all practical purposes the two concerns are one, and it would
be unconscionable to allow the owner of this fleet of steamers, worth
millions of dollars, to escape liability because it had turned them over
a year before to a $10,000 corporation, which is simply itself in
91. Douglas, J., in Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944).
92. The "alter ego theory," like the "instrumentality rule," is a verbal
formula used by the courts in disregarding the corporate entity. And like the
instrumentality rule, the alter ego theory has been criticized by the writers
in the field of corporation law. See note 65 supra.
93. Ibid.
94. LATTY,SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CoRPORATIoNs 119 (1936).

95. See S. H. Riddle v. Yosemite Creek Co., 322 P.2d 538 (Cal. 1958); Automotriz Del Golfo De Cal. v. Resnick, 47 Cal.2d 792, 306 P.2d 1 (1957); Shafford v. Otto Sales Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d 428, 308 P.2d 428 (1957).
96. 267 Fed. 676 (4th Cir. 1920).

NOTES
another form. ' 97 This reasoning is typical of that found in many of
the cases in this area. Unlike the subordination cases, the courts
here require in addition to insufficient capital such factors as fraud,
mismanagement or a failure by the shareholders to observe corporate
formalities. The more recent cases, however, indicate that the courts
are placing greater stress upon inadequate capitalization as a
determinative factor in the imposition of personal liability. In
Carlesimo v. Schwebel,9 8 where a corporate creditor sought to hold
the shareholders personally liable on the grounds of insufficient
capital, the court stated that: "the proper rule is that inadequate
financing, where such appears, is a factor, and an important factor, in
determining whether to remove the insulation to stockholders normally created by the corporate method of operation." 99 And in
Automotriz Del Golfo De Cal. v. Resnick,10 0 where personal liability
was imposed upon the shareholders, the court declared that: "Another factor to be considered in determining whether individuals
dealing through a corporation should be held personally responsible
for the corporate obligations is whether there was an attempt to
provide adequate capitalization for the corporation."''1 1
In none of the cases where shareholders have been held personally
liable for the corporate debts does it affirmatively appear that the
corporation was a "thin corporation," organized as a tax-saving device.
This does not mean, however, that the principles and consequences
applied in these cases are not also applicable to the participants in a
thin corporation. Quite clearly, the ratio of equity to debt in the
capital structure of a thinly incorporated enterprise might be so
low as to constitute inadequate capitalization within the meaning
of these cases. Moreover, where the participants in a thin corporation
fail to observe corporate formalities and have themselves neglected to
treat the corporation as a separate entity, the low equity capitalizationwill be of greater weight in determining whether they can continue
to avail themselves of the privilege of limited liability.

IV. CONCLUSION

New ideas and trends in the law are often limited by traditional
doctrines. This is especially true in the field of corporation law where
"the use of the entity privilege of separate capacities is at all times
subject to limitations of an equitable nature to prevent the privilege
from being exercised or asserted for illegal, fraudulent or unfair
97. Id. at 681.
98. 87 Cal. App. 2d 482, 197 P.2d 167 (1948).
99. 197 P.2d 167, 174.
100. 47 Cal.2d 792, 306 P.2d 1 (1957).

101. 306 P.2d 1, 4.
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purposes by those claiming under it .... 102 It is submitted that
the practice of thin incorporation as a tax-saving device is limited
by the traditional doctrine which requires shareholders to place
an adequate amount of equity capital unconditionally at the risk of
the business for the protection of corporate creditors.
As the foregoing discussion emphasizes, inadequate capitalization
is an abuse of the separate entity privilege which may result in the
subordination of shareholders' claims or the denial of the privilege
of limited liability. To date, however, the courts have failed to lay
down any definite tests for measuring the adequacy of the capitalization of a particular business. Moreover, it is not entirely clear to
what extent inadequate capitalization alone is determinative in
bringing about these results. In the subordination cases it appears
reasonably certain that the factor of inadequate capitalization will
be sufficient to support the subordination of shareholders' claims
against their insolvent corporation even in the absence of fraud
or mismanagement. In the personal liability cases, however, the
courts continue to speak in terms of the alter ego theory. Thus, it is
difficult to predict how "thin" a corporation may be and yet be
considered sufficiently capitalized to prevent the imposition of these
non-tax consequences.
The problem of determining a safe ratio of equity to debt for nontax purposes is considerably narrowed by the practical limits which tax
considerations place upon the thinning of a capital structure. One
tax writer has indicated that the ratio of equity to shareholder debt
may be pushed as low as 1:4 without having the shareholders' debt
contributions treated as stock for income tax purposes, 103 but he
concludes that "the tax advantages of thinning beyond [one part
equity to two parts debt] ...are small compared to the risk of having
the debt treated as stock . . . ."4 Thus the problem is essentially
reduced to a determination of whether rtios of equity to shareholder
debt in the range of 1:2 and 1:4, which are considered safe for tax
purposes, will be deemed adequate for non-tax purposes.
In the tax field one writer has suggested that the minimum allowable ratio of equity to shareholder debt be fixed by statute and that
any indebtedness in excess of the statutory ratio should be treated as
an equity investment.105 Such a statutory solution, if feasible, would
have the practical advantage of making the law more certain as to
both the tax and non-tax aspects of inadequate capitalization. But
it is generally agreed that the answer does not lie in legislative
102. BALLANTmE, CoaRoRATIONs 292 (rev. ed. 1946).

103. Schlesinger, Acceptable Capital Structures: How Thin Is Too Thin?, 5

U. FLA. L. REv. 355 (1952).
104. Id. at 365.

105. Semmel, Tax Consequences of Inadequate Capitalization,48 COLUM. L.

Ray. 201, 214-18 (1948).
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standards, because the need and ability for debt financing varies so
widely among different industries and even among different enterprises within a single industry. An one author has stated: "any
attempt at specifying a fixed ratio . . . faces an insurmountable

obstacle in the vast variety of particular circumstances confronting
different corporations at different times.' 10 6 Moreover, while it is
convenient to talk in terms of equity to debt ratios, it must be remembered that the courts have not adopted this language in either
the tax cases or the non-tax cases. Further, as one writer in the
field of close corporations has stated: "an infinite variety of circumstances and considerations in addition to the corporation's [equitydebt] . . . ratio may affect a decision on whether a particular

07
security represents debt or is stock."'
The same "insurmountable obstacle" which precludes the formulation of a workable legislative standard also faces the courts in any
attempt to lay down a fixed judicial standard of adequate capitalization. The courts, however, are in a position to add at least some
certainty to the law in this area by developing more fully the exact
nature of the concept of inadequate capitalization. At the present
time some confusion exists between the courts' application of this
term and its interpretation by certain text writers. 108
In the final analysis there are no presently reliable criteria for
determining what is an adequate ratio of equity to debt in the
capitalization of a corporation. The guide can only be stated in
general terms. The shareholders should finance their corporation
with equity investments sufficient to meet the normal risks attendant
on the conduct of a business of the nature and magnitude of the
corporate undertaking. Despite these uncertainties, however, the
lawyer who organizes a thinly incorporated enterprise should carefully consider the non-tax aspects of low equity capitalization before
fixing the ratio of equity capital to debt capital with which the
corporation will begin business. It is his task to mold the corporate
structure to meet the needs of the business enterprise and to satisfy
the legitimate desires of the participants. In order to properly perform this task, the lawyer must be able to predict with some
certainty the legal consequences, potential as well as immediate,
which can be expected to result from the type of structure created.

WILLIAM MILLER, JR.

106. RoHRLIcH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES §
See 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 2.10, at 59

10.03 n.72a (3d ed. 1958).

(1958).
107. Ibid.
108. See note 83 supra.
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THIRD PARTY'S RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY
UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN TENNESSEE
The Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act contains an exclusive

liability clause which provides:
The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee subject to
Workmen's Compensation Law on account of personal injury or death
by accident shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee,
his personal representative, dependents, or next of kin, at common law
or otherwise, on account of such injury or death. 1

The problem to which this note is directed is whether this clause
in the workmen's compensation act will be a bar to an action by a
third party for contribution or indemnity against the negligent
employer, where the employee has recovered from the third party
who was also negligent. Since the decisions construing the Tennessee
statute on this question have been limited to two in number, a large
portion of this discussion will be given to a comparison of opinions
from jurisdictions having statutory provisions similar to the one
quoted above.
I. CASES CONSTRUING THE TENNESSEE STAUTUE
The first case to discuss the exclusive liability section of the
Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act was Trammell v. Appalachian Electric Cooperative.2 The decedent in this case was killed
by an explosion of an electric transmission line recloser which was
located on a power line owned by the defendant Appalachian Electric
Cooperative (hereinafter referred to as Co-op). Action was brought
by the administrator against Co-op for the alleged negligence which
was said to have caused the decedent's death. The defendant then
filed a third-party complaint against the decedent's employer, Smith,
seeking full indemnity for any damages which it might be called
upon to pay because of decedent's death. The basis for Co-op's complaint was a then existing contract with Smith, which it alleged
included a contract for indemnity. Smith then moved that the
third-party complaint be dismissed since the decedent was his
employee under the Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act, which
thus limited his liability to that provided for by the statute. Whether
the exclusive liability section of the Tennessee Act is a bar to an
action by a third party on a contract for indemnity was never reached
in this case since the contract between Smith and Co-op was interpreted as containing no agreement whatsoever to indemnify Co-op.
1. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-908 (1956).
2. 135 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
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Equitable indemnity 3 was placed upon the same ground as contribution,4 and the court felt that neither could be allowed since they
would both involve a third-partyf procedure which was forbidden
under the federal rules of procedure. 5 Third-party procedure requisite
for an action for contribution or equitable indemnity in the suit
against the third party by the employee would also be forbidden
under present Tennessee law.6
The recent case of Moretz v. General Electric Company,7 is the

only other decision which has considered the exclusive liability
section of the Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act, and it is the
first to consider the effect which this provision has upon an action
for indemnity under Tennessee law.8 Action was brought in the
district court of Virginia by a citizen of Tennessee against General
Electric (hereinafter referred to as G.E.), a New York corporation,
for negligence in loading a trailer which Moretz drove for Mason
and Dixon Lines, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Mason-Dixon).
Over the objection of the plaintiff, Moretz, the defendant was
permitted to implead the plaintiff's employer, Mason-Dixon, in an
attempt to secure contribution or indemnity for any amount which
G.E. might be called upon to pay Moretz. The facts of this case and
the opinion subsequently written on appeal deserve close scrutiny.
When the "city driver" of Mason-Dixon picked up the trailer which
was loaded for Mason-Dixon by G.E., he noticed that the cargo was
improperly braced so he made this fact known to the G.E. loading
dock personnel. They refused to brace the load and said that even
if it did shift no damage would occur. The "city driver" then took
the loaded trailer to the Mason-Dixon terminal and informed personnel there of the improper loading. A promise was made to attend to the matter. When Moretz arrived to take the shipment to.
Kingsport, Tennessee, he made the customary inspection and foundthat the trailer had been sealed. While on the road the load,
shifted, the truck overturned, and Moretz was severely injured
Issues of negligence as to all three of the above parties were submitted to a jury. A verdict was rendered in favor of Moretz against.
3. Equitable indemnity is distinguished from contractual indemnity and is

treated as being merely an enlargement of the remedy of contribution. Id. at
515.
4. The court here cites the leading Tennessee cases which seem to recognize
contribution between joint tortfeasors. Id. at 515.
5. Fontenot v. Roach, 120 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Tenn. 1954).
6. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-120 (1956). This section, relating to additional
defendants brought in by a cross action, was repealed by Tenn. Acts 1957,
ch. 33, § 1.
7. 170 F. Supp. 698 (W.D. Va. 1959).
8. Since the prior case of Trammell v. Appalachian Elec. Co-op., 'supra
note 2, was decided on the basis that no contract of indemnity existed, the
effect of such a contract upon the exclusive liability clause of the workmen's.
compensation act was never determined.
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G.E. The jury was instructed that they could not find a verdict for
the plaintiff against his employer, Mason-Dixon, because of the
Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act; but a special verdict was
given to determine the negligence as between G.E. and Mason-Dixon,
and it was found that Mason-Dixon was guilty of negligence which
was a proximate cause of Moretz's injury. The court felt that
normally both G.E. and Mason-Dixon would be jointly liable to
9
Moretz as a result of their concurrent negligence, but since the
rights of Moretz against Mason-Dixon were fixed by the Tennessee
Workrfien's Compensation Act at the time of the accident, this was
held to prevent G.E. and Mason-Dixon from being liable as joint
tortfeasors. 10 The passive negligence of Mason-Dixon in failing to
correct the load after gaining knowledge of the condition was not
sufficient to insulate G.E. from liability, since G.E. had been actively
negligent in improperly loading the truck. Contribution was governed by a Virginia statute" which limits contribution to a situation
where the original party plaintiff has a right of action against the
alleged joint tortfeasor. Since Moretz had no right of action against
Mason-Dixon because of the exclusive liability provision of the
Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act, contribution was refused
G.E. For indemnity to lie the court ruled that there must be either
an express or an implied contract guaranteeing such, and since
neither was found the court granted Mason-Dixon's motion to dismiss.
Upon appeal the above decision of the district court was reversed,
2
and G.E. was allowed indemnity from Mason-Dixon.' The court of
appeals felt that the district court erred in its conclusion as to the
effect of the obligations imposed upon Mason-Dixon by certain interstate commerce regulations, 3 and the court found that the above
9. The jury found G.E. guilty of negligence and by a special verdict the
jury also found that Mason-Dixon was guilty of negligence which was a
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Under these conditions the court
felt that Mason-Dixon and G.E. would be concurrently negligent and jointly
liable. Moretz v. General Elec. Co., 170 F. Supp. 698, 703 (W.D. Va. 1959)
(citing RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 452 (1934)).
10. The court reasoned that since Mason-Dixon's exclusive liability to
Moretz was under the Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act it could not
be liable as a joint tortfeasor with G.E. Id. at 703.
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-627 (1950).
12. General Elec. v. Moretz, 270 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959).
13. 49 C.F.R. § 192.9 (a), (b) (1959) and 49 C.F.R. § 193.9 (a), (b) (1949)
provide that no motor carrier shall permit any motor vehicle to be driven if
the load is improperly loaded or secured, and that the load on every motor
vehicle shall be properly distributed, secured if necessary, and that all means
of fastening the load be properly inspected. 24 Stat. 383 (1887), 49 U.S.C,
§ 20(11) (1958), made applicable to motor carriers by 49 Stat. 563 (1935),
49 U.S.C. § 319 (1958), provides that any common carrier receiving property
for interstate transportation shall issue a bill of lading therefor and shall be
liable to the holder for any loss, damage or injury to the property caused by
it, and that no contract may be made which will exempt the carrier from this
liability.
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regulations should be considered as forming a part of the contract
between G.E. and Mason-Dixon, with the result that Mason-Dixon
was liable to G.E. for any loss caused by its failure to comply with
these obligations. Mason-Dixon was not excused from performing
its contractual obligation even though G.E. was found to be negligent.
Indemnity was thus allowed G.E. on the basis of an express contract
by Mason-Dixon to perform its duties with due care. From this
express contract the court implied a contract of indemnity for it was
felt that such a contract was of the essence of the contract to
carry the goods in a safe manner. The court then ruled that indemnity would not be barred in this case by the fact that another
case was pending between the employer, Mason-Dixon, and the
employee under the Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act, which
statute Mason-Dixon alleged excluded all other remedies against it
arising out of the present injury.
Therefore, from the cases interpreting the exclusive liability clause
of the Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act, the result is that
this decision by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
overruling the decision of the district court discloses at least one
inroad which may be used in this circuit to obtain indemnity in the
face of the exclusive liability clause of the Tennessee Act. The case
of Trammell v. Appalachian Electric Cooperative14 recognizes another instance where the employer's liability is not limited to the
amount granted under the Workmen's Compensation Act: namely,
where the employer has expressly agreed to indemnify the third
party for any loss which he might sustain as a result of the negligence
of the employer. The decisions which have been discussed above are
at present the only reported opinions dealing with the topic of this
note. Since they are federal court decisions, whether or not a third
party may require contribution or indemnity from an employer who
is covered by the Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act is still an
open question for the Tennessee courts.

II. CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CASES
In all of the decisions to be discussed in this note, the third party
is seeking either contribution or indemnity from the employer. He is
in effect seeking complete reimbursement from the employer or at
least payment of some portion of a judgment which he will have to
pay to the employee. The third party may seek indemnity on the
grounds of an express contract to indemnify, 15 or he may allege that
a contract of indemnity should be implied from an agreement to
14. 135 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
15. Yearicks v. City of Wildwood, 23 N.J. 379, 92 A.2d 873 (1952).
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perform services with reasonable care, 16 or he may seek to recover
on the basis of an independent duty which is owed him by the
employer.' 7 Although some courts have denied indemnity on the
basis of contributory negligence, 18 it has been suggested that the
requirement of freedom from negligence has no place in an action
for indemnity. 19 Although indemnity and contribution have been
treated as being of the same genus,2 0 certain distinctions are pertinent
in this consideration of their effect upon workmen's compensation.
Despite the fact that courts often confuse the two,21 contribution is
quite generally denied one of two joint tortfeasors, z2 but the courts
are fairly liberal in permitting indemnity2 which completely reimburses one of the parties. All courts seem to recognize the
validity of an express contract of indemnity even though the defense
of exclusive liability under a workmen's compensation act is interposed. 24 The conflicting views arise where there is no such contract
and the third party requests indemnity on one of the bases which will
be discussed subsequently in this article.

III. THE EXCLUSIVE LIABILITY CLAUSES
To protect the employer from liability other than that prescribed
by the particular workmen's compensation act, the statutes provide
an exclusive liability clause.25 Some of these clauses are quite
comprehensive, and if interpreted literally would bar any action by a
third party against an employer who has come within the provisions of the act. One such clause is found in the New York statute:
The liability of an employer ... shall be exclusive and in place of any
other liability whatsoever, to such employee, his personal representatives,
husband, parents, dependents or next of kin, or anyone otherwise entitled
16. Metzenbaum v. Golwyne Chem. Corp., 159 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)
(indemnity rested on the freight line's implied agreement to perform its

contract with reasonable care).
17. McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323
S.W.2d 788 (Mo. 1959).

18. See Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent Tortleasors: A Proposed

Rationale, 37 IowA L. REv. 517, 558 (1952).

19. Id. at 557; General Elec. Co. v. Moretz, 270 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959)
(third party entitled to indemnity from employer even though both were
found to be negligent); American Export Lines v. Revel, 266 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.
1959) (negligence of shipowner in supplying defective equipment not a bar to
his contractual right of indemnity).
20. Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1951); Trammell v.
Appalachian Elec. Co-op., 135 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
21. PRossER, TORTS § 46 n.74 (2d ed. 1955).

22. For a discussion of the confusion which has surrounded this term see
PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 21, at 233; Davis, supra note 18, at 537.
23. PRossER, op. cit. supra note 21, at 249-50.
24. E.g., Trammell v. Appalachian Elec. Co-op., 135 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Tenn.
1955); Yearicks v. City of Wildwood, 23 N.J. 379, 92 A.2d 873 (1952).

25. For Tennessee's exclusive liability clause see text at note 1 supra.
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to recover damages, at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death... 26

Although this statute specifically states that the liability of the
employer to "anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages" shall be
limited by his liability under the act, this has not prevented a third
party from obtaining indemnity from an employer covered by this
act.27 Although the Tennessee exclusive remedy clause merely
states that the exclusive remedy of the employee and those claiming
through him shall be limited by the act,28 a similar clause in the
North Carolina statute2 has been held to exclude any claims for
indemnity by a third party against the employer.2 0 A comparison of
the wording and results obtained under these very different clauses
demonstrate the general conclusion that the wording of the exclusive remedy or liability clauses is not controlling.3 ' There are,
however, exceptions to this statement, and the New Mexico court
provides a prime example of such. In Beal v. Southern Union Gas
Company,3 2 the Supreme Court of New Mexico refused to allow
contribution or indemnity in the absence of an express contract of
indemnity. Liability of the employer was governed by the restrictive
provisions of the workmen's compensation law:
Any employer who has elected to and has complied with the provisions
of this act, including the provisions relating to insurance, shall not be
subject to any other liability whatsoever for the death of or personal
injury to any employee, except as in this act provided; and all causes of
action, actions at law, suits in equity, and proceedings whatsoever, and all
statutory and common-law rights and remedies for and on account of such
death of, or personal injury to any such employee and accruing to any
and all persons whomsoever, are hereby abolished except as in this act
provided.
In dismissing the contention of the third party that the statute
should not preclude indemnity, the court said:
The authorities relied upon by appellant are distinguishable as arising
under less restrictive limitation provisions or involving some relationship
between the third party and the employer independent of joint negligence. Insofar as they may declare a contrary rule, however, we will not
follow them.34
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

N.Y. WoRxvN's CoMP. § 11.
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
Supra note 1.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10 (1950).
Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663, 73 S.E.2d 886 (1953).
2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPE-SATION § 76.30 (1952); Note, Contribution

and Indemnity: The Effect of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 42 VA. L. REV.

959 (1956).

32. 62 N.M. 38, 304 P.2d 566 (1956).
33. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-5 (1953).
34. 304 P.2d at 568.
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When the statutory language is as clear and compelling as that in the
New Mexico statute the court may feel itself bound by it, but in
statutes slightly less restrictive the courts have had little trouble in
35
allowing indemnity.

IV. INDEmNITY AND ITS RELATION TO THE ExcLusIVE LIABILITY CLAUSES
A statement by Dean Prosser aptly summarizes the futility of attempting to logically explain the indemnity cases involving workmen's compensation:
It is difficult to state any general rule or principle as to when indemnity will be allowed and when it will not ....
Probably, as is so
often the case in the law of torts, no one explanation can be found which
will cover all the cases; and the duty to indemnify, like so many other
duties, arises where community opinion would consider that in justice the
responsibility should rest upon one tortfeasor rather than another. 30
The following discussion is not an attempt to rationalize the conflicting results, but to collect and discuss the more recent workmen's
compensation decisions which are concerned with the problem of
37
indemnity.
Only where there is an express contract of indemnity do the courts
unanimously agree that indemnity may be allowed. 38 Where the
United States and a stevedoring firm were joined as third party
defendants in a suit by an injured longshoreman against the owner
of the vessel which he was loading, the district court allowed the
shipowner indemnity from the United States, and on a cross claim
by the United States against the employer stevedoring firm it was
held that the United States was entitled to indemnity even though
the employer had paid workmen's compensation under the Virginia
statute. 39 In allowing the United States indemnity the court said that
where there was a breach of contract for safe handling no express
contract of indemnity is necessary; it may be implied. 40 This leads
to the second classification where indemnity may be recovered irrespective of any exclusionary clause in a workmen's compensation
act.
Where there is an express contract to perform certain services, the
35. Attella v. General Elec. Co., 21 F.R.D. 372 (D.R.I. 1957); McDonnell
Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788 (Mo.
1959).

36. PROSSER, TORTS § 46 (2d ed. 1955).

37. See generally 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

§ 76 (1952); Note,

42 VA. L. REv. 959 (1956) (collection of pertinent cases through 1955).
38. See note 24 supra.
39. Revel v. American Export Lines, 162 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Va.), aff'd,
266 F.2d 82 (1959).
40. But in this case the court ruled that there was an express contract of
indemnity. 162 F. Supp. at 288.
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court may imply a contract of indemnity if the loss incurred was due
to a breach of duty by the party performing the services. Thus
where a contract provided, "to paint the new boiler room and equipment for General Electric Company at the Providence base plant
and to furnish all necessary equipment and labor, etc., in connection
therewith," 41 the court construed this as a contract to paint the
premises in a reasonably safe manner which carried with it an implied
contract of indemnity. As a result of this construction General
Electric Company was allowed indemnity from the injured painter's
employer, who set up the workmen's compensation act as a bar to the
third-party complaint. This same rationale was used in Pearson v.
National Trust for Historic Preservation42 where the court ruled that
even though no express contract of indemnity existed, the case was
indistinguishable from Ryan Stevedoring Company v. Pan-Atlantic
43
Steamship Corporation,
which had implied a contract of indemnity
from the express contract to perform the job in a workmanlike
manner.
In San Francisco Unified School District v. California Building
Maintenance Company,44 an action was brought against a maintenance
company, as employer, by the school district to recover the amount
paid the employee window-washer in satisfaction of a judgment
which he had obtained as a result of injuries sustained when he
fell while washing a defective window. The employer maintenance
company set up the defense of payment under the workmen's compensation act. In allowing the school district indemnity, the court
said that even though there was no express contract of indemnity one
would be implied since this action was similar to a breach of warranty; and since the action was not based upon the tortious conduct
of the employer, the doctrine of active-passive negligence 45 had no
application.
46
The recent case of Bowman v. Atlanta Baggage & Cab Company
represents another situation where limited indemnity was allowed.
The plaintiff was injured while driving a truck for his employer,
Western Union Telegraph Company (hereinafter referred to as
Western Union), when he collided with the defendant's truck, driven
41. Attella v. General Elec. Co., supra note 35, at 373.
42. 145 F. Supp. 378 (D.D.C. 1956).
43. 350 U.S. 124 (1956) (third party complaint based on breach of obligation to shipowner by employer to perform its work in a reasonably safe
manner). Accord: Metzenbaum v. Golwyne Chemicals Corp., 159 F. Supp. 648
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (indemnity rested on freight line's implied agreement to
perform its contract with reasonable care).
44. 328 P.2d 785 (Cal. App. 1958) (case arose as one might in Tennessee
since there was no third party procedure).
45. For a discussion of the doctrine of active-passive negligence in workmen's compensation cases see 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 76.44
(1952).
46. 176 F. Supp. 575 (N.D. Fla. 1959).
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by another employee of Western Union but rented from the defendant.
The injured employee collected workmen's compensation from Western Union and then brought this action against the defendant. Indemnity was sought from Western Union who was joined in the
action as a third party defendant. The court disallowed Western
Union's defense of full satisfaction under the workmen's compensation act, but it did allow the amount paid under the act to be pro
tanto satisfaction of any liability to the defendant. The court reasoned
that since Western Union had a statutory lien for the amount paid
under the workmen's compensation act against any judgment which
the plaintiff might receive from the defendant, it should be entitled
to a pro tanto set-off against any amount sought by the defendant
as indemnity. It would seem that the result obtained by this reasoning is unjustified. The statutory lien was against any amount which
the employee recovered from the third party; yet this court allows
the amount of the employer's lien to be set off against the third
party's suit for indemnity. The court is thereby depriving the third
party of full indemnity by permitting the employer to use against
the third party a lien which exists against the employee. The results
are the same to the employer whether or not this rationale is applied;
the difference lies in the amount of indemnity allowed the third
party.
In McDonnell Aircraft Corporationv. Hartman-Hanks-WalshPainting Company,47 the Supreme Court of Missouri spoke of "an independent duty" which the employer owed the third party. In this
case an employee obtained workmen's compensation from the employer and a judgment against the third party for injuries which he
received while painting the third party's plant. The third party was
found to have had a non-delegable duty to warn the employee of the
unsafe working conditions, but regardless of this fact the court ruled
that if the allegations of the third-party petition were proved to be
true the third party would be entitled to full indemnity. 48 It seems
that the employer had expressly agreed to perform the non-delegable
duty of the third party to warn the employee, and from this the
court said that the workmen's compensation act would not bar indemnity since the employer had breached an independent duty to
the third party which it had expressly agreed to perform.
The most frequently used reason for refusing indemnity is that the
employer's exclusive liability is under the workmen's compensation
4
act. Thus in Hill Lines, Inc. v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Company, indemnity and contribution were both denied when the court found that
47. 323 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. 1959).
48. The court adopted REsTATEMENT, REsTnUTIoN §§ 76, 95, 96 (1937)

the basis for its decision. 323 S.W.2d at 793-94.
49. 222 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1955).

as
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certain I.C.C. regulations were not sufficient to form an independent
duty on the part of the employer to indemnify the third party.50 In
Beal v. Southern Union Gas Company,5' a contractor's employees
brought an action against the gas company for injuries sustained by a
gas explosion which occurred in the course of their employment. When
the employer-contractor was brought in as a third-party defendant, the
court stated that his liability was limited by the workmen's compensation act since no express or implied contract of indemnity had been
found. To the same effect are Migias v. United States5 2 and Svedlund
v. Pepsi ColaBottling Company of Hawaii.53
Where the insurer of a subcontractor machinery company sought
indemnity from the construction contractor and the liability and
compensation insurer of the contractor for the amount paid the employee of the subcontractor, the court refused to allow the recovery
on a ground which is frequently mentioned by the courts in these
cases. The liability of the contractor to the injured employee of the
subcontractor was under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act.
This liability was remote and secondary to the primary liability of
the subcontractor and its compensation insurer. This doctrine of
primary and secondary liability 4 was again discussed in Sientki v.
Haffner 55 where a defendant third party sought indemnity from the
deceased's employer. The court ruled that the claim for indemnity
failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted
since the employer's negligence was secondary, if any, and that even
if a cause of action were stated it would be barred by the exclusive
liability clause of the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act.
Another ground for refusing indemnity was considered in Reed v.
New England Telephone and Telegraph Company.56 The employees of
an electric company were injured when a pole on which they were
working broke. The pole was owned by the telephone company but
occupied jointly with the electric company. When the telephone
company was sued it moved to bring in the electric company as a
third-party defendant from which it might seek indemnity. The defense that no contribution or indemnity will be allowed joint tortfeasors was raised,5 7 but the case was actually decided on the theory
50. Cf. General Elec. v. Moretz, 270 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959).

51. 62 N.M. 38, 304 P.2d 566 (1956).
52. 167 F. Supp. 482 (W.D. Pa. 1958) (action by United States for indemnity

from contractor covered by Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act).
53. 172 F. Supp. 597 (D. Hawaii 1959) (action for indemnity against Marine
Corps Exchange and against United States for amount which Pepsi Cola might
be required to pay enlisted man for injuries caused by explosion of drink
bottle).

54. See 2 LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 45, at 238-41; Davis, supra note 18, at
539-44.
55. 145 F. Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).

56. 175 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.H. 1958).
57. See PROSSER, TORTS 246-51 (2d ed. 1955).
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that to allow indemnity would violate the purpose of the workmen's
compensation statute by requiring the employer to pay more than
his statutory limit under the act.
Although indemnity was also refused on the basis that exclusive
liability was under the workmen's compensation act, the court in
Bertone v. Turco Products58 implied that the doctrine of activepassive negligence would not be accepted in New Jersey and that
therefor the claim of the defendant failed to state a cause of action.

V. CONTRIBUTION AND ITS RELATION TO THE ExcLuslvE LIABILITY CLAUSES

The question to be considered in this section is whether a third
party who is liable in tort to an employee may recover contribution
from the employer whose negligence concurred in causing the injury
when the employer is liable to the employee under a workmen's
compensation act.5 9 Although it is hazardous to make any general
statement as to a third party's right to indemnity, absent an express
contract to indemnify, it may be safely stated that the majority of
the courts even in jurisdictions which permit contribution between
joint tortfeasors 60 have refused to allow contribution from the employer who is covered by a workmen's compensation act.61 A denial
of contribution has been founded upon two theories: that the employer's liability is limited by the act, and that no common liability
exists between the employer and the third party.
In Hill Lines, Inc. v. PittsburgPlate Glass Company62 the third-party
tortfeasor sought indemnity and contribution from the employer.
Even though New Mexico allowed contribution between joint tortfeasors by virtue of a joint tortfeasor's act, it was held that the employer's exclusive liability was under the workmen's compensation
act; and indemnity and contribution were refused the third-party
tortfeasor. Again in Beal v. Southern Union Gas Company 63 contribution was refused on the grounds that the employer's liability was
limited by the workmen's compensation act 64 and that since the
58. 252 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1958) (manufacturer of cleaning solution sought
indemnity on ground that employer was negligent in failing to warn of
dangers of cleaning fluid).

59. See generally Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 977 (1957); 2 LARSON, op. Cit. supra
note 45, at 230; Davis, supra note 18, at 963.

60. See note 57 supra; Sturdivant, Joint Tortfeasors in Tennessee and the
New Third-Party Statute, 9 VAND. L. REv. 69, 71 (1955) (contribution allowed
in Tennessee except where conduct of parties is such as to deny them use of
the courts).

61. See note 59 supra.
62. 222 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1955).

63. 62 N.M. 38, 304 P.2d 566 (1956).
64. Accord: Reed v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 175 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.H.
1958) (exclusive liability under the act).
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employer's liability was limited by the act he could not be liable in
tort, and therefore he was not required to contribute under the tortfeasor's contribution act.
The theory that contribution will be refused on the ground that no
common liability exists between the third party and the employer
was used by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Wisconsin Power and
Light Company v. Dean.65 In that case the third party sought contribution from the employer, who had already paid the employee
workmen's compensation, on the ground that the employer's driver's
negligence was a proximate cause of the injury. Although Wisconsin
has a comparative negligence statute, the court ruled that the
negligent third party could not hold the employer liable for contribution even though the employer was also negligent. Since the
employer's liability was limited by the workmen's compensation act,
the court reasoned that there could be no common liability because
the act prevented the employee from proceeding against the em66
ployer on the ground of negligence.
Pennsylvania seems to be the only jurisdiction which allows the
third party contribution against the employer, and even there the
amount of contribution is limited. Thus in Brown v. Dickey67 the administrator of a deceased employee brought an action against a thirdparty tortfeasor, and the employer was joined as a third-party
defendant. The jury found both the third party and the employer
equally guilty of negligence. Following the decision in Maio v. Fahs68
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania allowed the third party contribution, but the amount of contribution was restricted to the limit placed
upon the employer by the workmen's compensation act. In so holding,
the court stated:
There is no common liability based on tort, for the employer is simply
not liable in tort. He retains only the statutory liability. To allow the
third party tortfeasor even the limited right of contribution up to the
amount of the employer's Workmen's Compensation liability, as we do
in Pennsylvania, is most generous indeed. He is not so well treated in
other jurisdictions. . . . The limited right of contribution that does
exist in Pennsylvania is based on the equitable principle that the plain69
tiff should not recover twice for the same wrong. (Citations omitted)

Although a third party may not obtain contribution or indemnity
65. 275 Wis. 236, 81 N.W.2d 486 (1957).
66. Accord: Bertone v. Turco Products, 252 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1958) (because
employee could not maintain action against employer the employer was not
liable in tort).
67. 397 Pa. 454, 155 A.2d 836 (1959).
68. 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940) (employer held liable to third party for
contribution).
69. 155 A.2d at 840.
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from the employer as a third party defendant in North Carolina,70 a
similar result of limited contribution as allowed in Pennsylvania is
reached by permitting the third party to set up the contributory
negligence of the employer as a defense pro tanto to the latter's
recovery in a subrogation suit.7 1 In discussing the method of contribution used in North Carolina, the district court in Moretz v. General
Electric Company72 concluded:
The legislature of the state of Tennessee has not seen fit to introduce
this doctrine into the Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Law. Equitable
considerations to the contrary notwithstanding, modification of the law
of a state is a prerogative of the legislature of the state and not within
the province of this Court.73

VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

As the equities vary with the facts from case to case, it is easy to
appreciate the difficulties which have faced the courts as they have
attempted to determine whether or not a negligent employer should
be compelled to bear the entire loss through indemnity or whether
he should share the cost through contribution to a negligent third
party. When the facts are like those in Brown v. Dickey,74 it would
be extremely harsh to compel the third party to bear the entire
loss. For in that case the third party and the employer were found
to be equally guilty of negligence. Must a court say in a situation
such as this that the workmen's compensation act forbids contribution
or indemnity to a third party? The argument has been made quite
forcibly that the third party who is a stranger to the act and who
receives no quid pro quo should not be excluded from contribution
or indemnity merely because he happened to injure an employee who
5
was covered by the act.7
On the other hand, it would hardly be equitable to require an employer to submit to a common-law liability without having the benefit of any of his common-law defenses such as contributory negligence,
assumpton of risk and the fellow servant rule. For in a case involving
injury to an employee covered by the act, the employer is deprived
of these common-law defenses. If the employee then recovers from
70. Brown v. Southern Ry, 202 N.C. 256, 162 S.E. 613 (1932) (exclusive
liability clause of workmen's compensation act barred action to hold employer

liable as joint tortfeasor).
71. Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663, 73 S.E.2d 886 (1933).
72. 170 F. Supp. 698 (W.D. Va. 1959).

73. Id. at 707.
74. 397 Pa. 454, 155 A.2d 836 (1959).
75. McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323
S.W.2d 788 (Mo. 1959).
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the third party and the employer is required to give contribution or
indemnity, he will be required to do so without ever having had the
opportunity to use any defense which he might have had against
the employee. 76 But perhaps the most frequently expounded defense
for exclusive liability is that proffered in Reed v. New England Telephone and Telegraph Company 7 where the court said:
The policy of this law would be circumvented if the employee may
obtain a possibly larger verdict from a third party, and if the third party
is permitted to obtain indemnity from the employer. The result would be
that the employee might ultimately obtain on account of his injuries
an amount from his employer larger than that recoverable under the
Workmen's Compensation Law."8
As previously demonstrated, the policy considerations are quite
evenly balanced both for and against allowing contribution or indemnity in the face of an exclusive liability clause. The divergence
of views can be rationalized on this basis: "The conflicting opinions
among circuits dealing with these situations can best be explained as
one of legal resourcefulness, used to reach the just result called for
by the facts .... -79

VII. CONCLUSION
As noted above, the question of whether contribution or indemnity
will be allowed in Tennessee in the face of the exclusive liability
section of the workmen's compensation act is still open for decision.
The inroads into exclusive liability have been sufficiently established
so that the court will have some precedent for any decision which
it makes. Absent legislation, Tennessee's course will probably depend upon the weight of persuasiveness which the facts present for
allowing the third party relief against the employer. It would certainly seem desirable for a party to know in advance the measure of
contribution or indemnity which he might be allowed from a
negligent employer when the third party has been so unfortunate
as to injure an employee covered by the workmen's compensation
act. At least two writers80 have suggested that this problem is one for
the legislature to determine, and such a situation as that which
76. See Brown v. Dickey, supra note 74, at 838.
77. 175 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.H. 1958).

78. Id. at 410.
79. Svedlund v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Hawaii, 172 F. Supp. 597, 601
(D. Hawaii 1959).
80. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 76.63 (1952); Note, Contribution
and Indemnity: The Effect of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 42 VA. L. REV.
959, 976 (1956).
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existed in Brown v. Dickey 8' clearly illustrates that court decisions
alone are insufficient in this area.
THOmAS H. RAINEY, JR.
81. While concurring in the decision to allow the third party the limited
right of contribution up to the amount of the employer's workmen's compensation liability, Justice Jones presented this view of the existing state of the

law:

,'While I believe that in the present posture of the law the result
reached by the majority of this Court is correct, yet I strongly believe
that the result is inequitable and unfair. The jury found Brown and
Dickey equally liable to the injured person: under the result reached
Brown must pay in discharge of this equal liability more than 90% of the
amount of the verdict, a most shocking situation. To correct such a situation appropriate legislation is required." 155 A.2d at 838.

